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Abstract—To provide proactive fault tolerance for modern
cloud data centers, extensive studies have proposed machine
learning (ML) approaches to predict imminent disk failures
for early remedy and evaluated their approaches directly on
public datasets (e.g., Backblaze SMART logs). However, in real-
world production environments, the data quality is imperfect (e.g.,
inaccurate labeling, missing data samples, and complex failure
types), thereby degrading the prediction accuracy. We present
RODMAN, a robust data preprocessing pipeline that refines data
samples before feeding them into ML models. We start with
a large-scale trace-driven study of over three million disks
from Alibaba Cloud’s data centers, and motivate the practical
challenges in ML-based disk failure prediction. We then design
RODMAN with three data preprocessing techniques, namely
failure-type filtering, spline-based data filling, and automated pre-
failure backtracking, that are applicable for general ML models.
Evaluation on both the Alibaba and Backblaze datasets shows
that RODMAN improves the prediction accuracy compared to
without data preprocessing under various settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern cloud data centers are equipped with millions of
hard disk drives spanning across the globe [1], [39]. With such
a million-scale fleet of disks, disk failures become prevalent,
complex, and cascading. For a data center equipped with high-
end disks with an annual failure rate of 1% [35], administrators
need to handle hundreds of disk failures/replacements on a daily
basis. While data centers in practice are protected by RAID
or erasure coding for fault tolerance, frequent disk failures or
concurrent disk failures in a single disk group still lead to data
unavailability [27]. To maintain data availability, it is crucial
for administrators to be not only reactive to disk failures that
have occurred, but also proactive to imminent disk failures, in
large-scale disk deployment.
Recent studies show that machine learning (ML) can
accurately predict imminent disk failures based on the already
available SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting
Technology) logs in modern disks [10], [19], [24], [25], [28],
[38]–[40], [42]. At a high level, existing ML-based disk failure
prediction approaches first build a classifier model using the
features (e.g., SMART attributes) of a training dataset that
labels both positive and negative samples (i.e., failed and
healthy disks, respectively). They then predict if a disk will
fail within days or weeks by feeding its features into the
classifier model. Despite the extensive studies in the literature,
applying ML to disk failure prediction still faces three practical
challenges in a complex cloud production environment.
(i) Inaccurate labeling. Existing studies often label fail-stop
events as the only positive samples [10], [28], [39]. However,
field studies report that soon-to-fail disks experience latent
anomalies prior to actual failures, such as latent sector errors
[9] and fail-slow symptoms [18]. Such pre-failure anomalies
should also be labeled as positive samples, so as to reflect more
accurately the failure patterns. To include pre-failure anomalies,
a naı¨ve solution is that during the training phase, we label
the samples as positive if they appear within some pre-failure
period before the actual failures occur. However, such a solution
has two issues. First, it is unclear how to configure the “right”
length of the pre-failure period without holistic measurements.
Second, the pre-failure status of a failed disk is determined
only after its failure actually occurs. If the failure event occurs
right after the training phase, the samples before the failure
event remain to be marked as healthy (negative), which still
inaccurately reflects the failure status of those samples.
(ii) Incomplete datasets. Disk failure prediction becomes
inaccurate if it operates on incomplete SMART logs; for
example, field studies report that more than half of SMART
failure signals are missing in failed disks [32]. In production,
disk monitoring systems may stop recording failure signals due
to network failures, software maintenance/upgrades, system
crashes, and human mistakes [17]. In our production experience,
some special commercial activities may require the suspension
of the disk monitoring systems for server offloading. One
solution is to interpolate the missing failure signals, but
improper interpolation can severely compromise the prediction
accuracy.
(iii) Diverse failure types. Disk failures can manifest in
different forms, such as disk crashes, or fine-grained errors like
latent sector errors [9], [34] and data corruptions [8]. Some
failures are due to accumulated factors such as frequent occur-
rences of sector errors [34], while others are due to transient
factors such as power faults [41] or faulty interconnects [21].
SMART logs provide insufficient details to address the diverse
types of disk failures.
We present RODMAN, a robust disk failure prediction
management pipeline designed to address the above three
challenges. Our goal is to emphasize the necessity of proper
preprocessing on the training datasets when deploying disk
failure prediction in the field. Note that some existing ML-
based disk failure prediction approaches (e.g., [10], [28], [38])
are directly evaluated on the public Backblaze SMART logs
[3]. However, we find that the Backblaze dataset also shares the
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above three challenges (i.e., only fail-stop events are labeled
as positive samples, data missing exists, and failure types
are unavailable). Such approaches, when re-evaluated under
different deployment settings, give inaccurate prediction if the
training datasets are not properly preprocessed.
RODMAN uses three data preprocessing techniques to refine
data samples from a large-scale dataset before feeding them into
ML model training. Its techniques are applicable for general
ML models. RODMAN is now deployed in the production data
centers at Alibaba Cloud. We summarize our contributions as
follows.
• We conduct a measurement study on a one-year span of
disk logs from a fleet of more than three million disks
deployed at Alibaba Cloud, so as to motivate the need of
data preprocessing in practical disk failure prediction. To
our knowledge, our measurement study is among the largest
scale in the literature. See §II and §III.
• We propose three data preprocessing techniques, namely:
(i) failure-type filtering, which selects only the positive
samples of statistically predictable failure types for training;
(ii) spline-based data filling, which fills the values of missing
samples via cubic spline interpolation [37] to account for
any possible abrupt changes in such missing samples; and
(iii) automated pre-failure backtracking, which not only
automatically determines a window of pre-failure samples
that are to be labeled as positive for any soon-to-fail disk,
but also avoids mis-labeling any failed disk that appears
right after the training phase. See §IV.
• We evaluate the accuracy gain of each data preprocessing
technique on both Alibaba and Backblaze datasets. RODMAN
achieves a disk failure prediction rate of up to 92.8% and
82.4% under a false positive rate of 0.1% and 4.0% on the
Alibaba and Backblaze datasets, respectively, and improves
the accuracy by 6.2-23.7% over state-of-the-art ML-based
disk failure prediction approaches [10], [28]. See §V.
II. METHODOLOGY
We collect data from a production cloud infrastructure at
Alibaba Cloud that covers multiple data centers across the globe.
Each data center is composed of multiple nodes organized in
racks, and each node is attached with multiple disks.
Figure 1 depicts our data collection architecture. We collect
three types of data: SMART logs, system logs (syslogs), and
trouble tickets (see details below). Each node collects SMART
logs from its attached disks and syslogs from its operating
system, and periodically reports the collected data to one of the
proxies of our data collection architecture. The proxies relay the
collected data to a data processing service, called MaxCompute
[5] that supports an SQL-like interface for users to query the
stored data similar to Hive [2]. Also, we deploy a maintenance
system that identifies abnormal disk behaviors and submits the
corresponding trouble tickets to the data processing service.
RODMAN takes the three types of data as input, performs data
preprocessing, and predicts disk failures.
We refer to our collected dataset as the Alibaba dataset. It
was collected over a one-year span from July 2017 to June
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Figure 1: Overview of data collection.
2018. It covers a population of over three million disks of
tens of disk models from five disk vendors, and the disks are
deployed in dozens of data centers across the globe. Table I
summarizes the dataset, which includes three types of data.
SMART logs. SMART is a widely used disk status reporting
tool that collects performance and reliability statistics for
different attributes at disk firmware. Our SMART logs cover
the error-related or status-related attributes for all disks at
different times. Each SMART log entry is a key-value pair, in
which the key is the disk ID (serial number), and the value
contains the disk model, disk vendor, timestamp, and a list
of SMART attributes. Each attribute is a numerical value. It
is either normalized (e.g., wearing percentage) or raw (e.g.,
power-on hours), and either instantaneous (e.g., temperature)
or cumulative (e.g., number of reallocated sectors).
Our collected SMART attributes are vendor-specific and
the number of collected attributes varies across different disk
vendors. Nevertheless, we find that most disk models report at
least 38 attributes. Also, all attributes related to disk errors are
universally reported at the daily granularity. In our one-year
span, our SMART logs cover over one billion entries.
Syslogs. All nodes in this study run the major Linux distribu-
tions. The Linux kernel is installed with the syslog daemon
[16] that is configured to collect system-level events at the
hourly granularity. Each syslog event contains the process ID,
timestamp, and description of the event (e.g., the disk is not
found). It also specifies the logical partition (e.g., /dev/sda)
that allows us to automatically correlate each event with a disk.
Syslog events can be categorized into different severity levels.
We focus on five of them triggered by disk failures: Emergency,
Alert, Critical, Error, and Warning. In our one-year span, our
syslogs cover over four trillion entries.
Trouble tickets. Our maintenance system applies rule-based
checking procedures defined by administrators to the SMART
logs and syslogs, so as to check for any abnormal behaviors,
including kernel-level errors/alerts and SMART error-related
attributes that are above some pre-configured thresholds. For
any abnormal behavior, the maintenance system generates a
trouble ticket, which contains the node ID, disk ID, timestamp,
and a description about the error (e.g., a snippet of the syslog
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Source Format Description Granularity Total size
SMART logs Key-value pairs Disk status reports Daily > 1 billion log entries
Syslogs Plain texts Kernel runtime events Hourly > 4 trillion entries
Trouble tickets Event entries Node ID, disk ID, timestamp, and error messages Per event ~31,000 events
Table I: Dataset overview.
event message). In our one-year span, we have collected around
31,000 trouble tickets.
III. DATA ANALYSIS
To motivate the design of RODMAN, we first analyze the
Alibaba dataset, with emphasis on the disk failure patterns in
production and the data missing issue in the dataset (§III-A).
Due to privacy concerns, we cannot publicize the Alibaba
dataset at the time of the writing. Thus, we also analyze the
public Backblaze dataset [3] for cross-validation (§III-B).
A. Alibaba Dataset
Annualized failure rates. We first estimate the annualized
failure rates (AFRs) of several representative disk models. We
define the AFR as the ratio of the number of failed disks
reported in our trouble tickets in the one-year span of our
dataset to the total number of disks.
Recall that the Alibaba dataset covers tens of disk models
from five disk vendors (§II). We focus on the three largest
models with the most disks within each vendor (i.e., 15 in
total). We denote each disk model by “Vendor”“k”, where
“Vendor” corresponds to a letter (‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, and ‘E’)
for each of the five vendors, and “k” (1 to 3) corresponds to
the k-th numerous model; for example, the disk model “A2”
represents the second numerous model of vendor A.
Table II presents the results of the 15 selected disk models.
The AFR of each disk model is at most 3.8%, and most disk
models (10 out of 15) have an AFR of less than 1%. Such low
AFRs are also found in previous disk failure prediction studies
[10], [39], and hence we must address the well-known data
imbalance issue (i.e., the number of failed disks is much less
than that of healthy disks).
Failure types. We now correlate both syslogs and trouble
tickets to identify the manifested failure types in production.
We classify the disk failures reported in trouble tickets into
six major types, namely data corruptions, I/O request errors,
unhandled errors, disk-not-found errors, unhealthy disks, and
file system corruptions. We focus on the two largest disk models
(in terms of the number of disks in our dataset), A1 and B1,
as the representatives. Table III shows each failure type and
the proportions of all failures in two disk models A1 and B1.
Data corruptions and I/O request errors are the most
dominant failure types (44.1% and 19.1% for A1, and 39.2%
and 45.5% for B1, respectively). Data corruptions refer to the
unrecoverable data loss (e.g., integrity check errors) that cannot
be directly detected by disks [8], while I/O request errors refer
to the failed I/O requests (e.g., due to bad sectors or transient
disconnection) that are detectable by disks.
Unhandled errors (18.4% and 9.8% for A1 and B1, respec-
tively) occur when failed disks return unknown error codes after
Model Vendor% Total% AFR
A1 27.7% 12.5% 0.56%
A2 21.1% 9.5% 0.67%
A3 18.2% 8.2% 0.59%
B1 29.2% 10.8% 0.68%
B2 28.1% 10.3% 0.64%
B3 20.1% 7.7% 0.38%
C1 30.1% 2.5% 3.8%
C2 18.6% 1.5% 2.8%
C3 11.0% 0.88% 1.1%
D1 41.6% 2.7% 0.30%
D2 25.1% 1.6% 1.0%
D3 18.9% 1.2% 2.0%
E1 62.9% 1.7% 0.53%
E2 14.6% 0.39% 0.78%
E3 13.5% 0.35% 0.65%
Table II: Failure patterns for different disk models in the Alibaba
dataset, including the percentage of disks in the same vendor
(“Vendor%”), the percentage of disks in the whole disk population
(“Total%”), and the annualized failure rate (“AFR”). Due to privacy
concerns, we cannot report the number of disks for each disk model.
Type Description A1 B1
Data
corruptions
Unrecoverable data loss (e.g., in-
tegrity check errors)
44.1% 39.2%
I/O request
errors
Failed I/O requests (e.g., bad sectors,
transient disconnection)
19.1% 45.5%
Unhandled
errors
Unknown disk error codes (e.g., un-
recognized error codes, unexpected
corruption to error codes)
18.4% 9.8%
Disk-not-
found errors
Disk component failures (e.g., faulty
interconnects)
6.8% 1.5%
Unhealthy
disks
Soon-to-fail disks reported by rule-
based checking
2.1% Nil
File system
corruptions
Unmountable file system (e.g., meta-
data corruption)
Nil 0.19%
Others No further information 9.1% 3.9%
Table III: Failure types for disk models A1 and B1.
receiving I/O requests from the kernel. For example, the kernel
does not recognize an error code defined by the disk vendor, or
failed disks encounter unexpected errors (e.g., on-chip memory
corruption) that give meaningless error codes.
Disk-not-found errors (6.8% and 1.5% for A1 and B1,
respectively) refer to the permanent disk component failures
(e.g., faulty interconnects) that make the whole disks detached
from the kernel. They differ from I/O request errors, in which
the disks remain attached.
Unhealthy disks (2.1% for A1, but not found for B1) are
reported by our internal rule-based checking tool based on
SMART logs. The tool periodically checks several SMART
attribute values against pre-specified thresholds, and reports
the disks that likely fail soon (e.g., too many sector errors).
File system corruptions (0.19% for B1, but not found for
A1) refer to the disks with unmountable file systems. They are
a rare failure type, as modern file systems provide protection
3
Model Failed HealthyDMR 10 days% 25 days% DMR
A1 21.1% 43.5% 31.7% 6.3%
A2 21.3% 33.6% 14.4% 6.6%
A3 22.4% 51.0% 36.7% 7.3%
B1 28.1% 23.4% 15.1% 6.8%
B2 29.5% 15.7% 13.4% 5.8%
B3 20.8% 16.2% 12.5% 8.4%
C1 15.4% 73.7% 36.8% 7.4%
C2 13.2% 36.8% 21.1% 6.1%
C3 18.5% 40.0% 40.0% 6.1%
D1 19.5% 33.3% 16.7% 6.0%
D2 13.2% 22.2% 33.3% 6.4%
D3 12.9% 50.0% 0% 6.1%
E1 16.7% 56.7% 56.7% 16.3%
E2 14.2% 0% 0% 15.6%
E3 14.6% 20.0% 20.0% 9.7%
Table IV: Data missing analysis for different disk models in the
Alibaba dataset, including the data missing ratios (DMRs) for failed
and healthy disks, as well as the percentages of data-missing failed
disks that miss at least consecutive 10 and 25 days of samples
before being reported in trouble tickets (“10 days%” and “25 days%”,
respectively).
in metadata (e.g., error-correction codes in inode tables) [7].
Also, we cannot determine the failure types of small fractions
of failed disks (9.1% and 3.9% for A1 and B1, respectively)
due to the lack of recorded information.
Data missing. Ideally, the SMART data is collected for all
disks continuously on a daily basis, yet our dataset contains
incomplete SMART data in both failed and healthy disks (§I).
Here, a disk is said to have data missing on a day if it misses all
collected SMART attributes instead of some particular SMART
attributes. To show the severity of data missing, we compute
the data missing ratio (DMR) as the total number of missing
days over the expected total number of occurrence days if no
data missing occurs. For failed disks, we count the expected
occurrence days from when the disks first appear in the dataset
until they fail; for healthy disks, we only focus on those that
appear at the beginning of the dataset, and hence the expected
number of occurrence days is one year.
To examine the data missing behavior before a failed disk
is reported in a trouble ticket, we measure the missing gap for
any failed disk that has data missing between the last reported
date of the SMART logs and the reported date of the trouble
ticket. Here, we focus on the percentages of data-missing failed
disks with such missing gaps of at least consecutive 10 and
25 days.
Table IV presents the results of our 15 selected disk models.
Data missing of failed disks is more severe than that of healthy
disks. For failed disks, the DMRs among 15 disk models are
12.9-29.5%, while for healthy disks, the DMRs are 5.8-16.3%.
Also, the data-missing failed disks tend to miss data for a long
consecutive period of days before being reported in trouble
tickets. For example, 9 out of 15 disk models have at least
30% of data-missing failed disks with at least 10 days of data
missing, while 8 out of 15 disk models have at least 20% of
data-missing failed disks with at least 25 days of data missing,
before the reported dates of trouble tickets.
To understand the pre-failure data missing issue, we study
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Figure 2: Missing gap distributions for data-missing failed disks in
disk models A1 and B1.
Model Failed HealthyDMR 10 days% 25 days% DMR
H1 0.31% 0% 0% 0.20%
S1 1.3% 0.08% 0.08% 0.36%
Table V: Data missing analysis for different disk models in the
Backblaze dataset.
the distribution of the missing gap between the last recorded
date of the SMART logs and the recorded date of the trouble
ticket for a data-missing failed disk in the two largest disk
models A1 and B1. Figure 2 shows the histograms and the
complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) of
the missing gap distributions for both disk models. Among the
data-missing failed disks, 43.5% and 23.4% of data-missing
failed disks in A1 and B1 have data missing for at least 10
consecutive days, respectively. This suggests that failed disks
may have already exhibited abnormal behaviors before they
are reported in trouble tickets, thereby leading to data missing.
B. Backblaze Dataset
We cross-validate our findings on the public Backblaze
dataset [3]. We focus on two disk models that are used in
prior studies [10], [28], [38] and have the largest population
and the most failures: (i) Hitachi HDS722020ALA330 (denoted
by H1) over a 18-month span from April 2014 to September
2015, and (ii) Seagate ST4000DM000 (denoted by S1) over a
40-month span from September 2014 to December 2017.
For H1, 133 out of 4,586 disks are failed, while for S1,
2,688 out of 32,320 disks are failed. The corresponding AFRs
for H1 and S1 are 1.9% and 2.5%, respectively, similar to the
AFRs in the Alibaba dataset. We find that data missing also
exists in the Backblaze dataset (Table V), although the DMRs
are much lower than those in the Alibaba dataset (Table IV).
Unfortunately, the Backblaze dataset does not document the
detailed failure symptoms or root causes, so we do not have
failure-type details.
IV. RODMAN DESIGN
We present RODMAN, a robust disk failure prediction
pipeline. Figure 3 shows RODMAN’s architecture. RODMAN
takes the SMART logs, syslogs, and trouble tickets as input. It
converts SMART logs into time-series samples, in daily granu-
larity, for different disks. Each sample contains a set of SMART
attributes at a time point. It uses syslogs and trouble tickets for
failure-type correlation and labeling, respectively. It first refines
the samples with three data preprocessing techniques that are
4
Data input RODMAN
Syslogs
Trouble
tickets
SMART
logs
Data
preprocessing
Failure-type
filtering
Spline-based
data filling
Automated
pre-failure
backtracking
Modeling
Prediction
Feature
construction
Basic
features
Difference
features
Statistical
features
Figure 3: Architecture of RODMAN.
applied to training dataset before model training (§IV-A-§IV-C).
It constructs features for model training (§IV-D). It finally
performs modeling and outputs prediction results (§IV-E).
We conclude this section with the implementation details of
RODMAN (§IV-F).
Our analysis focuses on two largest disk models of the
Alibaba dataset, A1 and B1, that have the most numbers of
disks (and the most numbers of failed disks) among all disk
models we consider. As they belong to different vendors, they
are expected to have varying failure characteristics [8], [34].
We also validate our analysis for other disk models from both
Alibaba and Backblaze datasets (§V). RODMAN focuses on
offline learning and assumes that the whole training dataset
is available in advance, while we address online learning on
real-time data in future work.
A. Failure-Type Filtering
Recall from Table III that there are various types of disk-
related failures. Our goal is to leverage the diverse failure types
to help our model training in RODMAN.
Analysis. Before examining the failure type information, we
first analyze the correlation between the SMART attributes
and the disk failures reported by our trouble tickets. We
compute Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient (SRCC)
[36] between each of the SMART attributes and disk failures.
SRCC ranges from -1 to +1 and shows the positive/negative
correlation between two variables; a larger absolute value (with
the maximum equal to one) implies that the two variables are
more correlated, while 0 means no correlation. In our case,
one variable refers to the raw value of a SMART attribute,
while another variable refers to the indicator variable whether
a disk is failed (1 means failed, or 0 otherwise).
Table VI shows the four most failure-correlated SMART
attributes for disk models A1 and B1 with the largest absolute
SRCC values. Three of the SMART attributes appear in
both A1 and B1, namely SM5 (Reallocated Sectors Count),
SM197 (Current Pending Sector Count), and SM198 (Offline
Uncorrectable Sector Count), and the remaining ones are
SM187 (Reported Uncorrectable Errors) for A1 and SM196
(Reallocated Event Count) for B1. We find that no SMART
attribute in either disk model is dominant, as the highest values
are 0.401 and 0.352 for A1 and B1, respectively. Furthermore,
Table VII shows the percentage of failed disks with zero values
for the four most failure-correlated SMART attributes for A1
Model SM5 SM187 SM197 SM198
A1 0.397 0.401 0.314 0.283
Model SM5 SM196 SM197 SM198
B1 0.352 0.325 0.336 0.330
Table VI: Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficients of the selected
SMART attributes and disk failures for A1 and B1.
Model SM5 SM187 SM197 SM198 All
A1 49.6% 81.9% 60.8% 60.9% 43.9%
Model SM5 SM196 SM197 SM198 All
B1 92.1% 92.1% 79.5% 94.0% 78.2%
Table VII: Percentage of failed disks with zero values in the selected
SMART attributes for A1 and B1; “All” means that all four attributes
have zero values.
Model SMART 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A1
SM5 3 3 3 3 3
SM187 3 3 3
SM197 3 3 3
SM198 3 3 3 3
B1
SM5 3
SM196
SM197 3
SM198 3 3
Table VIII: KS test for evaluating the distribution differences of each
SMART attribute between failed and healthy disks for A1 and B1,
grouped by failure types (1: Data corruptions; 2: I/O request errors;
3: Unhandled errors; 4: Disk-not-found errors; 5: Unhealthy disks; 6:
File system corruptions; 7: Others). A 3means that the distribution
is statistically different.
and B1. We find that 43.9% and 78.2% of failed disks have
zero values in all the four SMART attributes for A1 and B1,
respectively, conforming to the prior study that many failed
disks have zero values in failure-correlated SMART attributes
[32]. Our results suggest that individual SMART attributes are
weak indicators of disk failures.
Nevertheless, by grouping the SMART attributes by failure
types, we can differentiate the distributions of SMART attribute
values between the healthy and failed disks. Our insight is
that only a subset of failures can be measured by SMART
logs. If there is a larger discrepancy in the distributions, then
the trained classifier can recognize such failures more easily.
Specifically, we use the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
test [29] to statistically evaluate the distribution discrepancies
of each SMART attribute between the healthy and failed disks.
Table VIII shows the KS test results, in which the statistically
different distributions (with a confidence level of 95%) are
marked with ticks (3). We call a failure type predictable
if there is more than one tick in the underlying SMART
attribute distributions. Thus, the predictable failure types are
data corruptions, disk-not-found errors, and unhealthy disks
for A1, and data corruptions for B1.
We use the disk failures of predictable failure types to build
our classifier; on the other hand, we filter any disk failure
of unpredictable failure types. We do not consider training a
different model for each failure type, as some failure types
(e.g., unhealthy disks for A1 and file system corruptions for
B1) have very limited positive samples for accurate training.
Our training procedure. We summarize our training pro-
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Figure 4: Comparison of interpolation approaches: forward filling
(Ffill), linear interpolation (Linear), and cubic spline interpolation
(Spline). Cubic spline interpolation provides better fitting for abrupt
changes than other two approaches.
cedure based on failure-type filtering as follows. Before
training a classifier for a particular disk model, we first
choose a configurable number (four in our case) of most
failure-correlated SMART attributes. We then parse the syslogs
to group the failure types and compare the above SMART
attribute distributions between the healthy and failed disks
for different failure types with the KS test. Finally, we
identify the failure types as predictable if there is more
than one failure-correlated SMART attribute with statistically
different distributions between the healthy and failed disks.
When training the classifier, we only use the disk failures of
predictable failure types as positive samples and discard the
unpredictable ones.
B. Spline-based Data Filling
Before applying model training to a dataset, we must first
address missing data samples in every failed or healthy disk.
We discuss different data filling approaches.
Naı¨ve data filling approaches. One naı¨ve approach is forward
filling, which fills any missing sample with the value of any
last observed sample in the series (e.g., for the series “1, 2,
miss, 3, 4”, we fill “miss” with “2”). Another naı¨ve approach
is linear interpolation, which fits any missing sample on a
linear line that connects the endpoints of each missing gap
(e.g., for the series “1, 2, miss, 3, 4”, we fill “miss” with “2.5”).
Both approaches, albeit implementation-friendly, unfortunately
cannot address complicated changes in SMART values. For
example, the counts of error-related SMART attributes often
ramp up abruptly for a soon-to-fail disk.
Our data filling approach. RODMAN uses cubic spline
interpolation [37] to fill any missing samples. At a high level,
for each missing gap over a time series, we select the two
closest available data samples at both ends (i.e., four samples
in total) to construct piecewise cubic polynomials that connect
all four samples while ensuring a “smooth” polynomial. Cubic
spline interpolation provides better fitting for the abrupt changes
than the naı¨ve approaches (see Figure 4 for comparisons), while
avoiding oscillated fitting that occurs in high-degree polynomial
interpolation (a.k.a. Runge’s phenomenon). It reduces to a linear
function for the time series with stable monotonic trends (e.g.,
power-on-hours).
We address two corner cases in data filling. First, the missing
gap may be open-ended, such that the missing samples may
be observed at the very beginning (or at the very end) of the
dataset. In this case, we re-use the first (or the last) piecewise
polynomial in the time series from our interpolation results to
extrapolate those missing samples. Second, if the missing gap
lasts longer than some pre-specified threshold (currently set to
30 days), we drop all the samples for the time series.
We do not claim that spline-based data filling can address the
missing samples for all data types, yet it improves the prediction
accuracy over naı¨ve approaches (§V-B) and suffices for our
practical deployment. Optimizing the data filling strategy is
our future work.
C. Automated Pre-Failure Backtracking
To accurately reflect the disk failure characteristics, we
propose to mark the pre-failure samples of failed disks as
positive. However, the length of the pre-failure period is
typically unknown. Thus, we need to address two questions:
(i) How do we automatically determine the length of the pre-
failure period? (ii) Given the pre-failure period, how do we
properly backtrack and mark disk samples?
Automated determination of the pre-failure period. We
identify the pre-failure period using Bayesian change point
detection [15] for failed disks in SMART logs, so as to pinpoint
the time when the SMART values of failed disks significantly
vary (i.e., the failure behaviors start to appear). Specifically,
during our training procedure for each disk model, we first
identify the four most failure-correlated SMART attributes
based on SRCC and select the failed disks of predictable
failure types (§IV-A). We pick a sufficiently long detection
window (e.g., 60 days in our implementation) before the failure
happens for each failed disk that has already been labeled from
trouble tickets. We compute the change probability (i.e., the
posterior distribution of a time-series up to a sample given
the time-series before the sample) of each of the four selected
SMART attributes on each day for each failed disk over the
detection window. Given a sequence of change probabilities
over the detection window of each failed disk, we use the
z-score (i.e., the number of standard deviations from the mean
of change probabilities) to measure if the change is significant.
We now choose the critical z-score values as ±2.5 of the
standard deviation (i.e., a confidence level of 98.76%), such
that if the z-score of the change probability falls outside the
range [-2.5, 2.5], we regard the change as significant. We
obtain the numbers of days between the significant change
and the disk failure for all failed disks. Finally, we find the
75th-percentile of the numbers of days obtained for each of
our selected failure-correlated SMART attributes, and choose
the maximum 75-th percentile among the SMART attributes
as our pre-failure period.
Based on our calculation, the pre-failure periods of A1 and
B1 are 29 and 27 (days), respectively. Note that finding the
pre-failure period can be automated, and the length of the
pre-failure period varies for different disk models.
Pre-failure backtracking. Given the pre-failure period, we
backtrack the pre-failure samples of a failed disk and mark
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Figure 5: Pre-failure backtracking.
them as positive samples. We define a backtracking window as
the number of backtracked days in which we mark the samples
of a failed disk as positive. Currently, we set the backtracking
window length (denoted by n) as the pre-failure period that is
automatically selected for each disk model.
Figure 5(a) shows the baseline design of our pre-failure
backtracking method. Suppose that the training phase is set
right before day T0 and the testing phase starts on day T0. Let
Ti be the i-th backtracked day before T0 at which a sample
si is observed, where i > 0 (note that Ti is earlier than T0).
Let Ty (for some y > 0) be the last day on which the positive
sample is observed (i.e., the disk failure occurs). Each dot
in the figure represents a sample of SMART logs in daily
granularity. We mark a failed disk at Ty as a positive sample
(denoted by a black dot). We also mark n samples (denoted
by gray dots) prior to the disk failure as positive samples. The
earlier samples before the backtracking window are marked as
negative samples (i.e., healthy) (denoted by white dots).
However, there exists a potential issue with the baseline
pre-failure backtracking design. Recall that the maintenance
system generates the trouble tickets of failed disks on the day
of disk failure occurrence (§II). Thus, we regard the disks
that are not reported in the trouble tickets as healthy in the
training dataset, but the disks may fail right after the training
phase and their samples now become “mis-labeled” as negative.
Figure 5(b) illustrates the issue. If a disk fails right after T0
(i.e., the black dot), then we are supposed to mark all samples
of its backtracking window as positive samples (i.e., the gray
points). However, we do not have this information during model
training as the failure happens after the training phase. From
this example, we see that for healthy disks, their samples in
the backtracking window are actually ambiguous samples, as
they may fail right after the training phase.
To avoid mislabeling negative samples, we propose an
observation window to drop the ambiguous samples of pre-
failure disks that are potentially mislabelled as negative. We
now set the observation window as the backtracking window
n and drop the (ambiguous) samples from Tn to T1.
Summary. Our complete pre-failure backtracking scheme with
the observation window works as follows. If a disk is healthy,
we drop all its samples within the observation window (from
Tn to T1) and mark any sample outside the observation window
(from Tn+1 backwards) as negative. Otherwise, if a disk is
failed (say in day Ty), we backtrack n samples within the
backtracking window (i.e., from Ty+n to Ty+1) to mark them
as positive, as well as the remaining samples outside the
backtracking window as negative.
D. Feature Construction
Our feature construction uses three categories of features.
• Basic features: We select the error-related and status-related
SMART attributes (§II) as the basic features.
• Difference features: For each SMART attribute selected as
a basic feature, we calculate the difference values over two
consecutive samples in the time-series.
• Statistical features: We compute six statistical charac-
teristics for each basic/difference feature over a window
of samples: arithmetic mean, standard deviation, median,
exponential weighted moving average, sum, and difference
between the start and end points of the window. We use
two window sizes, 7 and 14 days, for computing the above
statistical characteristics for each basic/difference feature.
For example, for A1 (B1), we obtain 1,248 (988) features,
including 48 (38) basic features, 48 (38) difference features,
and 1,152 (912) statistical features. Also, for H1 (S1) in the
Backblaze dataset (§III-B), we obtain 884 (1,248) features,
including 34 (48) basic features, 34 (48) difference features,
and 816 (1,152) statistical features.
E. Modeling
We formulate our disk failure prediction problem as a
time-series binary classification problem. Among many clas-
sification algorithms, researchers [12], [13] show that tree-
based ensemble learning methods (e.g., random forests and
boosted trees) have the best overall prediction accuracy. As
RODMAN generates fewer than 4,000 features, it is shown that
boosted trees are preferred [12], [13]. By default, RODMAN
uses LightGBM [23], a boosted tree model with high training
performance and memory efficiency, yet RODMAN is also
applicable for other ML models (§V-C). Note that we do not
claim the novelty of our modeling approach.
F. Implementation
We implement the whole RODMAN pipeline in Python with
around 2,000 LoC. We use the authors’ Python implementation
of LightGBM [4], and realize other ML algorithms for
comparisons using various Python tools (e.g., NumPy [30],
SciPy [22], and Scikit-learn [31]). RODMAN is currently
deployed at Alibaba Cloud.
We also realize RODMAN for the Backblaze dataset. Since
the Backblaze dataset does not include failure types, we only
realize automated pre-failure backtracking and spline-based
data filling. Our RODMAN prototype is now open-sourced (§I).
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V. EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate RODMAN on both Alibaba and Backblaze
datasets and show that its data preprocessing improves the
prediction accuracy. We address the following questions:
• Can automated pre-failure backtracking identify the proper
backtracking window length and improve the prediction
accuracy? (Exp#1)
• Can failure-type filtering (i.e., using only predictable failure
types for training) accurately predict disk failures of both
predictable and unpredictable failure types? (Exp#2)
• How effective is spline-based data filling? (Exp#3)
• Can RODMAN improve the prediction accuracy over state-
of-the-art disk failure prediction approaches? (Exp#4)
• How does the prediction accuracy of RODMAN vary for
different configuration parameters (e.g., false positive rates
and training periods)? (Exp#5 and Exp#6)
A. Evaluation Methodology
Configuration. For the Alibaba dataset, recall that it spans
from July 2017 to June 2018 (§III-A). By default, we set
the training phase from July 2017 to April 2018 (10 months)
and the testing phase for May 2018 (one month). RODMAN
predicts disk failures in the testing phase. We set a high training-
to-testing ratio to 10:1 by default, so as to have sufficient
positive samples for training (as a reference, previous work
sets the training-to-testing ratio to 4:1 [10] or 3:1 [28] for the
Backblaze dataset evaluation); nevertheless, we also consider
smaller training-to-testing ratios starting from 2:1 (Exp#6) and
in the Backblaze dataset evaluation (see below). To mitigate
data imbalance and the bias toward the substantial volume of
negative samples, our training chooses the positive samples
over the entire training phase, while choosing the negative
samples only on the last day observed (i.e., the end of April
2018 without the observation window, or the last day before
the observation window if enabled).
For the Backblaze dataset (§III-B), we change the training-
to-testing ratio to 3:1 as in [28]. As in the Alibaba dataset
evaluation, our training chooses the positive samples over the
entire training phase and the negative samples only on the
last day observed to mitigate data imbalance. Given the long
dataset durations (18 months for H1 and 40 months for S1),
we apply model training in a sliding fashion to allow multiple
runs. Specifically, we use the first three months (e.g., January
to March) as the training phase and the fourth month (i.e.,
April) as the testing phase. We slide one month (i.e., February
to April for training and May for testing) for the next run,
and so on. We have 15 and 37 runs in total for H1 and S1,
respectively. We present the average results over all runs.
Metrics. Our disk failure prediction is a binary classification
problem (i.e., failed or healthy). We focus on two metrics:
• True positive rate (TPR): The ratio of the number of
predicted failed disks to the total number of actual disk
failures in one-month testing.
• False positive rate (FPR): The ratio of the number of falsely
predicted failed disks (which are indeed healthy) to the total
number of healthy disks in one-month testing.
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Figure 6: Exp#1 (Effectiveness of automated pre-failure backtracking).
We show the TPRs of every five days (from 0 to 30 backtracking
days) and the TPR of our automatically determined backtracking days
(29 days for A1 and 27 days for B1 as underlined in the figures;
“Auto” for H1 and S1). For A1 and B1, we compare two components:
failure-type filtering (“FF”) and observation window (“OW”).
For the Alibaba dataset, we set the default FPR threshold
to 0.1% as in Microsoft’s production [39]. We mainly present
the results for disk models A1 and B1, while we address other
disk models in the Alibaba dataset in §V-C. For the Backblaze
dataset, we set a higher default FPR threshold to 4% to make
the TPR comparable to that for the Alibaba dataset. Note that
we still observe the accuracy gain of RODMAN for different
FPR thresholds (Exp#5).
B. Analysis of Data Preprocessing Techniques
Exp#1 (Effectiveness of automated pre-failure backtrack-
ing). We first consider the Alibaba dataset. Recall that our
automated pre-failure backtracking selects the backtracking
window as 29 and 27 days for A1 and B1, respectively (§IV-C).
We evaluate RODMAN for various lengths of backtracking
windows and show the effectiveness of automated pre-failure
backtracking. Before running the experiment, we have enabled
spline-based data filling. We also compare two components of
RODMAN: (i) failure-type filtering (i.e., using only the disk
failures of predictable failure types for training instead of using
all disk failures), and (ii) observation window (i.e., discarding
a window of samples before the end of training for healthy
disks).
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Figures 6(a) and 6(b) show the TPR results versus the number
of backtracking days for A1 and B1, respectively. First, the
TPR increases as we increase the number of backtracking
days from zero, as we now introduce more positive samples
to alleviate data imbalance. Without pre-failure backtracking
(the zero-day case), RODMAN can only correctly predict 68.7%
of disk failures of A1 and 26.9% disk failures of B1 when
both the failure-type filtering and the observation window are
enabled. As we increase the number of backtracking days, the
TPR for both disk models increases and reaches the highest
between the 25 and 30 backtracking days (note that the TPR
differences in this range are within 2% for both disk models).
In particular, the TPR reaches 92.8% for A1 and 68.4% for
B1 in our automatically determined backtracking days (29 and
27 days, respectively). After 30 backtracking days, the TPR
decreases, as we may now falsely inject more positive samples.
This shows that our automated pre-failure backtracking can
reach the highest TPR range.
We next compare the TPR with and without failure-type
filtering for A1 and B1. With failure-type filtering, the TPR
increases for both disk models. For example, without pre-failure
backtracking (the zero-day case), failure-type filtering itself
increases the TPR from 49.8% to 68.7% for A1 and from
17.1% to 26.9% for B1. We provide more detailed evaluation
of failure-type filtering in Exp#2.
We further study the TPR gains with the observation window
(which equals the number of backtracking days (§IV-C)). En-
abling the observation window for non-zero backtracking days
on top of failure-type filtering further increases the TPR for both
disk models in all cases, by 0.20-2.09% and 0.48-1.77% for A1
and B1, respectively. Although the accuracy improvement is
small compared to the gains of failure-type filtering, we regard
the observation window as a complementary approach for pre-
failure backtracking: while pre-failure backtracking focuses on
adding positive samples, the observation window keeps only
the obvious negative samples and drops the ambiguous ones.
Finally, we validate our analysis with the Backblaze dataset.
We study the accuracy gain when automated pre-failure
backtracking with the observation window is enabled (recall
that the Backblaze dataset has no failure types). Figures 6(c) and
6(d) show the TPR results versus the number of backtracking
days for H1 and S1, respectively; we omit the plots for the
backtracking days from 35 to 60 days as the TPR keeps
decreasing. The automated backtracking days vary from 2 to
58 days for H1 and from 3 to 40 days for S1 across different
runs. On average, automated pre-failure backtracking achieves
the highest TPR, which is 72.3% for H1 and 82.4% for S1.
Exp#2 (Effectiveness of failure-type filtering). Recall that
with failure-type filtering, we use the failures of predictable
failure types (i.e., data corruptions, disk-not-found errors, and
unhealthy disks for A1, and data corruptions for B1) for
training. We now give a breakdown of the prediction accuracy
of RODMAN for each failure type, with and without failure-
type filtering. Here, we have enabled automated pre-failure
backtracking with the observation window and spline-based
Type A1 B1w/o FF w/ FF w/o FF w/ FF
Data corruptions 81.4% 95.1% 51.0% 70.2%
I/O request errors 88.5% 94.2% 56.8% 61.1%
Unhandled errors 92.0% 96.0% 60.6% 69.7%
Disk-not-found errors 92.3% 76.9% 50.0% 0%
Unhealthy disks 42.9% 71.4% Nil Nil
File system corruptions Nil Nil Nil Nil
Others 95.5% 90.9% 100.0% 100.0%
Table IX: Exp#2 (Effectiveness of failure-type filtering). We report
the TPR for each failure type with or without failure-type filtering
(“FF”); “Nil” means no failures belong to the failure type in testing.
data filling. We focus on A1 and B1 in the Alibaba dataset.
Table IX shows the TPR results for different failure types
with and without failure-type filtering. We make two obser-
vations. First, RODMAN successfully identifies the failures
of unpredictable failure types (e.g., unhandled errors), even
being trained with only predictable failure types. Second, for
most failure types, failure-type filtering improves the prediction
accuracy. An exception is disk-not-found errors, which show
a lower TPR for both disk models with failure-type filtering
(another exception is “Others”), even though disk-not-found
errors are a predictable failure type in A1.
One explanation to the above observations is that various
disk failure symptoms can share the same root causes (e.g.,
both data corruptions and I/O request errors can be caused by
a failing disk sector) [18]. Thus, training a classifier with only
representative failure types can correctly identify different types
of imminent disk failures, including those of unpredictable
failure types. The trade-off is that by filtering the unpredictable
failure types, we may unexpectedly drop disk failures whose
root causes manifest as both predictable and unpredictable
failure types. Nevertheless, the overall prediction accuracy
improves, as shown in Exp#1.
Exp#3 (Effectiveness of spline-based data filling). We eval-
uate different data filling approaches, including forward filling,
linear interpolation, and cubic spline interpolation. Note that
the data filling approaches fill in different values, and hence
return different backtracking windows from our automated pre-
failure backtracking. For example, for the Alibaba dataset, the
backtracking windows for forward filling, linear interpolation,
and cubic spline interpolation are chosen as 26, 28, and 29 days,
respectively for A1, as well as 24, 27, and 27 days, respectively,
for B1. We also evaluate the no-filling case by training the raw
dataset directly, in which we set the backtracking windows as
29 and 27 days for A1 and B1, respectively, as in cubic spline
interpolation. Here, we have enabled failure-type filtering for
A1 and B1.
Figure 7 shows the results. For the Alibaba dataset, no-
filling has a lower TPR than both forward filling and cubic
spline interpolation, implying that data filling is necessary
for high prediction accuracy. Also, cubic spline interpolation
achieves the highest TPR (92.8% for A1 and 68.4% for B1). A
surprising observation is that linear interpolation has the lowest
TPR (even lower than no-filling). One possible reason is that
most failure-related attributes series are of non-linear patterns
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Figure 7: Exp#3 (Effectiveness of spline-based data filling). We com-
pare no-filling (“None”), forward filling (“Ffill”), linear interpolation
(“Linear”), and cubic spline interpolation (“Spline”).
(e.g., SM5, SM187, and SM197). For non-linear patterns, both
forward filling and linear interpolation fill in less accurate
values compared to cubic spline interpolation; even worse,
linear interpolation may introduce more noise samples than
forward filling, as the latter only fills any missing gap with
duplicate but non-noise samples.
For the Backblaze dataset, cubic spline interpolation still
achieves the highest TPR (72.3% for H1 and 82.4% for S1).
Note that the rankings of prediction accuracy across different
filling methods are different in the Alibaba and Backblaze
datasets. One possible reason is that the two datasets have
different data missing rates and patterns (Table IV vs. Table V).
C. Analysis of Whole RODMAN
We evaluate RODMAN as a whole with all data preprocessing
techniques enabled (i.e., failure-type filtering (for the Alibaba
dataset only), spline-based data filling, and automated pre-
failure backtracking with the observation window). We compare
RODMAN with the baseline, in which we only perform data
filling with cubic spline interpolation on the raw dataset but
do not apply other data preprocessing techniques.
Exp#4 (Comparisons with state-of-the-arts). We compare
the accuracy of RODMAN with two state-of-the-art ML-based
disk failure prediction approaches [10], [28]. The ML model
in [10] is Regularized Greedy Forests (RGF) [33], while that
in [28] is Random Forests (RF) [11]. Our goal here is not
to advocate any particular ML model; instead, we show that
RODMAN improves the respective accuracy of a given ML
model as a general framework compared to the baseline.
One challenge is that both approaches in [10], [28] build on
completely different datasets, so it is infeasible to completely
reproduce their methodologies. Thus, we make the “best efforts”
to implement their approaches based on their description
and conduct our comparison study under fair conditions.
Specifically, we train and test all approaches using our datasets.
Since the feature construction process largely depends on
the data preprocessing and statistical analysis of the specific
datasets, for fair comparisons, we choose our constructed
features for all approaches.
To this end, we compare the baseline and RODMAN on three
ML models: LightGBM, RGF, and RF (i.e., six variants in
total). We implement the baseline RGF and RF to resemble
the approaches in [10] and [28], respectively. To alleviate data
imbalance, we perform the standard under-sampling technique
ML models A1 B1 H1 S1
LightGBM
Baseline 69.7% 57.1% 64.6% 76.2%(±21.3%) (±4.4%)
RODMAN 92.8% 68.4% 72.3% 82.4%(±15.3%) (±3.6%)
RGF
Baseline 67.2% 53.4% 56.4% 65.0%(±20.6%) (±8.1%)
RODMAN 88.6% 67.2% 62.6% 75.4%(±17.3%) (±5.0%)
RF
Baseline 62.6% 48.3% 50.7% 73.5%(±19.7%) (±3.4%)
RODMAN 86.4% 64.5% 60.7% 80.9%(±17.6%) (±3.5%)
Table X: Exp#4 (Comparison with state-of-the-arts). For H1 and S1,
we also report 95% confidence intervals (in brackets) of all runs.
on negative samples as described in [10], [28], such that the
ratio of positive to negative samples is 1:10 (the prediction
accuracy is maintained for various ratios from 1:1 to 1:10 [28]).
In contrast, for the Alibaba (Backblaze) dataset, RODMAN and
its baseline implementation use the positive samples in the
whole 10-month (3-month) training phase and the negative
samples on the last day observed (§V-A). Furthermore, we
conduct grid-search and configure the following model settings
that achieve high prediction accuracy: for LightGBM, we set
2,000 trees; for RGF, we set the maximum number of trees as
2,000 and use L2-norm regularization for RGF; for RF, we set
2,000 trees.
Table X shows the results. RODMAN increases the TPR of
all ML models over the baseline by 21.4-23.7%, 11.3-15.8%,
6.2-10.0%, and 6.2-10.4% for A1, B1, H1, and S1, respectively.
This shows that RODMAN improves the prediction accuracy
for different ML models and different datasets.
Exp#5 (Impact of FPR thresholds). In general ML-based
prediction, we can increase the TPR by increasing the FPR
threshold (or vice versa). Here, we vary different FPR thresh-
olds and measure the corresponding TPR results to verify
whether the prediction accuracy gain of RODMAN over the
baseline (without RODMAN) is still preserved in both Alibaba
and Backblaze datasets. Figures 8(a) and 8(b) show the TPR
results of A1 and B1, respectively, when we vary the FPR
threshold from 0.04% to 0.1%, while Figures 8(c) and 8(d)
show the TPR results of H1 and S1, respectively, when we
vary the FPR threshold from 1.0% to 4.0%. The TPR gain of
RODMAN over the baseline is fairly stable for different FPR
thresholds, with around 20%, 10%, 8%, and 6% gains for A1,
B1, H1, and S1 respectively.
Exp#6 (Impact of training periods). Recall that for the
Alibaba dataset, we use a 10-month training period by default.
We now reduce the length of the training period for positive
samples. Clearly, reducing the length of the training period
reduces the TPR, yet our goal here is to evaluate the robustness
of RODMAN to the prediction accuracy gain over the baseline
(recall that we still choose one day of negative samples (§V-A)).
We vary the training period from 2 to 10 months, counted
backwards from April 2018, while we still set the test phase
in May 2018. Figure 9 shows the impact of different training
periods. If we reduce the training period for positive samples
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Figure 8: Exp#5 (Impact of FPR thresholds).
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Figure 9: Exp#6 (Impact of training periods).
from the default 10 months to 2 months, the TPR of RODMAN
drops from 92.8% to 64.3% for A1 and from 68.4% to 46.2%
for B1, since we now have fewer positive samples for training.
Similar to Exp#5, RODMAN consistently increases the TPR
over the baseline by around 20% and 10% for A1 and B1,
respectively, for different training periods.
Remarks. We show that RODMAN improves the prediction
accuracy via its data preprocessing techniques, and its accuracy
gain is shown in both Alibaba and Backblaze datasets, different
ML models, as well as different parameter choices. For the
Alibaba dataset, we also validate the effectiveness of RODMAN
for other disk models. Here, we choose the disk models A2
and B2, since both of them also have large numbers of disks,
as well as large numbers of positive samples for training.
The TPR of RODMAN achieves 96.4% and 63.2% for A2
and B2, respectively, while that of the baseline only achieves
70.6% and 43.9%, respectively (we do not illustrate the results
in plots here). We do not validate RODMAN for other disk
models (e.g., for vendors ‘C’, ‘D’, and ‘E’), as we do not
have sufficient positive samples for training and our prediction
analysis becomes less representative. We pose the analysis for
such disk models in future work.
VI. RELATED WORK
Field measurements. Extensive field measurement studies
show the prevalence of disk failures in production environments.
Earlier studies [32], [35] show that the actual disk failure
rates are much higher than the datasheet values. In particular,
Google’s study [32] shows that over half of failed disks do
not record any SMART failure signal. In addition to disk
failures, faulty interconnects and protocol stack errors are also
dominant [21]. Furthermore, field studies on NetApp clusters
reveal patterns of latent sector errors [9], [34] and silent data
corruptions [8]. A more recent study from EMC [27] analyzes
the failures of about one million of disks over a five-year span,
and shows that reallocation sector counts are good indicators of
predicting disk failures. Instead of emphasizing the prevalence
of disk failures, our field study focuses on motivating the need
of data preprocessing. To address the limitations of SMART
logs alone [32], we leverage syslogs and trouble tickets for
more accurate characterization of disk failures.
Disk failure prediction. A spate of studies show that highly
accurate disk failure prediction is achievable using classical
statistical techniques and machine learning models. Examples
include Bayesian classifiers [19], rank-sum tests [20], Markov
models [14], [40], rule-based learning [6], back-propagation
neural networks [42] and recurrent neural networks [24],
regularized greedy forests [10], random forests [28], and online
random forests [38]. Based on disk failure prediction, some
studies further propose proactive fault tolerance approaches to
protect against soon-to-fail disks, such as proactive replication
[26] and adaptive scrubbing [28]. However, existing studies
mainly validate their proposals using the datasets from a small-
scale disk population (e.g., [6], [14], [19], [20], [24]–[26], [40],
[42]) or the public Backblaze SMART logs [3] (e.g., [10], [28],
[38]). We complement these studies through our proposed data
preprocessing techniques and the correlation of multiple data
sources (i.e., SMART logs, syslogs, and trouble tickets).
VII. CONCLUSION
We have witnessed extensive ML-based disk failure pre-
diction studies in the literature, but limited emphasis is put
on proper preprocessing on training datasets. This paper fills
the void and posits the need for improving the quality of
the training datasets used for ML model training instead of
designing new ML models. We present RODMAN, a robust disk
failure prediction management pipeline that is now deployed
in a large-scale cloud service provider. It builds on three data
preprocessing techniques (i.e., failure-type filtering, spline-
based data filling, and automated pre-failure backtracking) to
carefully refine and correlate SMART logs, syslogs, and trouble
tickets before feeding them into any ML model. We show that
RODMAN improves the disk failure prediction accuracy for
general ML models on different datasets.
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